I first blogged about the ANONWHOIS blocking list back in 2010. It was very useful to identify domains were ownership information was cloaked from the public. Why? Because many of us in the anti-spam and security community think that for a domain being used for commercial purposes, it isn't right to hide who the owner is. And this obstruction to transparency is often exploited by bad guys who send spam and malware, to try to make it harder to identify them.
All about DNSBLs, aka blocklists/blacklists // Since 2001 // Published by Al Iverson
Status of bl.spamcannibal.org: DEAD
Back in 2016, I used this page to report on a temporary system issue with the Spam Cannibal DNSBL.
Today (May 30, 2018) I'm updating this page to let folks know that they should immediately cease using the Spam Cannibal blocking list.The domain spamcannibal.org seems to have expired and been taken over by somebody else. If you decide to visit the website, be careful! It tried to get me to install what I assume to be malware.
If you use this DNSBL in your mail server configuration, you're probably now rejecting all mail, as the domain has a wildcard DNS entry. This kind of thing makes a blocklist look like it has listed the whole world. Every IP address checked usually shows up as listed.
The Spam Cannibal DNSBL has been around since at least 2003. It was started by a gentleman that I think prefers to be anonymous, so I'm choosing not to name him. It was basically spamtrap-driven, though I believe it would sometimes list /24 blocks of IP addresses in response to some spamtrap hits. It wasn't that widely used, but back in the old days, it often put the fear of god into marketing senders when seeing a hit against this list on their favorite DNSBL checking tool. This was also good in that it helped to drive marketer understanding of how sending to bad addresses can cause bad things to happen. As the list was primarily spamtrap-driven, it was mostly safe for hobbyist mail server use (in my opinion, anyway).
I reached out to the publisher of the Spam Cannibal DNSBL He let me know that the DNSBL is dead and gone. It is no longer an ongoing concern.
Fifteen years is a pretty good run, if you ask me. I wish him best of luck on any future projects.
May 31, 2018 update: The operator of Spam Cannibal is working with some smart folks to shut down the list in a graceful fashion. While there is no longer a "wildcard DNS" issue, the list is no longer being updated and is retired; you should still remove it from your mail server configuration.
Today (May 30, 2018) I'm updating this page to let folks know that they should immediately cease using the Spam Cannibal blocking list.
The Spam Cannibal DNSBL has been around since at least 2003. It was started by a gentleman that I think prefers to be anonymous, so I'm choosing not to name him. It was basically spamtrap-driven, though I believe it would sometimes list /24 blocks of IP addresses in response to some spamtrap hits. It wasn't that widely used, but back in the old days, it often put the fear of god into marketing senders when seeing a hit against this list on their favorite DNSBL checking tool. This was also good in that it helped to drive marketer understanding of how sending to bad addresses can cause bad things to happen. As the list was primarily spamtrap-driven, it was mostly safe for hobbyist mail server use (in my opinion, anyway).
I reached out to the publisher of the Spam Cannibal DNSBL He let me know that the DNSBL is dead and gone. It is no longer an ongoing concern.
Fifteen years is a pretty good run, if you ask me. I wish him best of luck on any future projects.
May 31, 2018 update: The operator of Spam Cannibal is working with some smart folks to shut down the list in a graceful fashion. While there is no longer a "wildcard DNS" issue, the list is no longer being updated and is retired; you should still remove it from your mail server configuration.
SURBL: Adding ABUSE sublist, deprecating SC & AB
The domain blocking list SURBL announced today that it is deprecating the SC (Spamcop) and AB (AbuseButler) sublists, migrating their data into a new ABUSE sublist. They note that the WS (Bill Stearns' sa-blacklist) sublist is also going to be migrated into ABUSE in 2016.
SURBL also recently announced the addition of SURBL-specific blocking notification messages to the popular SpamAssassin spam filtering software.
SURBL also recently announced the addition of SURBL-specific blocking notification messages to the popular SpamAssassin spam filtering software.
Status of no-more-funn.moensted.dk: DEAD
The "No More Funn" blocking list (DNSBL zone no-more-funn.moensted.dk) was run by a gentleman from Denmark using the alias dr. Jørgen Mash. First observed in 2002, listing criteria included spam sources, IP address ranges that appeared dynamic, bulk mailers not required confirmed opt-in (double opt-in) and more. It was easy for email service providers (ESPs) to end up listed there, and ESP clients would often ask about those listings because they would show up in DNSBL lookups, though it's not clear that the list was widely used for spam blocking.
At some point in 2012, the list was taken offline. At the end of 2015, the website reports that the list is still offline. Thus, I'm going to call this one "dead."
At some point in 2012, the list was taken offline. At the end of 2015, the website reports that the list is still offline. Thus, I'm going to call this one "dead."
What is blacklist.zap?
Here's a blast from the past: Remember blacklist.zap?
There were various "blacklist.zap" lists and they were all indicative of blocking when sending to mailboxes hosted behind "FrontBridge" anti-spam and security protection:
There were various "blacklist.zap" lists and they were all indicative of blocking when sending to mailboxes hosted behind "FrontBridge" anti-spam and security protection:
- The list 85.blacklist.zap specifically referred to FrontBridge's use of the Composite Blocking List (CBL). If you were blocked by 85.blacklist.zap, it meant that your sending IP address was listed on the CBL.
- The list 86.blacklist.zap specifically referred to FrontBridge's use of the Spamhaus Block List (SBL). If you were blocked by 86.blacklist.zap, it meant that your sending IP address was listed on the SBL.
- The list 87.blacklist.zap specifically referred to FrontBridge's use of the Spamhaus Exploits Block List (SBL). If you were blocked by 87.blacklist.zap, it meant that your sending IP address was listed on the XBL.
- The list 88.blacklist.zap specifically referred to FrontBridge's own internally-generated blacklist of sending IP addresses noted to be spammy, usually based on a high percentage of mail from that IP address being denoted as spammy.
FrontBridge was later acquired by Microsoft and I think it's been a long time since anybody has seen blacklist.zap blocking in a bounce message, but I thought it would be good to keep a record of this for posterity's sake.
Status of dnsbl.burnt-tech.com: DEAD
Uh-oh! On or about September 19th, the domain burnt-tech.com seems to have expired. Now when you visit the website, you are informed that the domain is for sale. Also, you'll now find a wildcard A record in DNS, meaning that any lookup of any host name in DNS under burnt-tech.com will result in a positive response being returned.
The net result here is that due to the domain now having a wildcard A record, any users of the Burnt Tech DNSBL now find that they are blocking all inbound mail. If you were using the dnsbl.burnt-tech.com blocking list to filter inbound spam, you'll need to remove it from your mail server or spam filter configuration immediately, as it is going to impede your ability to receive any mail.
Reviewing Internet Archive versions of the Burnt Tech DNSBL website, it appears that the list has been in action since at least 2006. From a 2015 archived copy of the website: "The Block List runs entirely automated and designed to avoid listings of spamtrap hits due to bounces of forged spam, virus bounces, and "real" mail servers emitting the occasional spam. It tries very hard to avoid listing legitimate mail sources. It does not attempt to list every possible spam source."
No other information was available regarding ownership, listing criteria or history of this DNSBL.
(H/T: Matthew Vernhout)
The net result here is that due to the domain now having a wildcard A record, any users of the Burnt Tech DNSBL now find that they are blocking all inbound mail. If you were using the dnsbl.burnt-tech.com blocking list to filter inbound spam, you'll need to remove it from your mail server or spam filter configuration immediately, as it is going to impede your ability to receive any mail.
Reviewing Internet Archive versions of the Burnt Tech DNSBL website, it appears that the list has been in action since at least 2006. From a 2015 archived copy of the website: "The Block List runs entirely automated and designed to avoid listings of spamtrap hits due to bounces of forged spam, virus bounces, and "real" mail servers emitting the occasional spam. It tries very hard to avoid listing legitimate mail sources. It does not attempt to list every possible spam source."
No other information was available regarding ownership, listing criteria or history of this DNSBL.
(H/T: Matthew Vernhout)
Status of truncate.gbudb.net: ALIVE
The "Truncate" DNSBL (zone truncate.gbudb.net) lists IPv4 addresses that have been observed transmitting "email containing spam, scams, viruses, or other malware based on statistics in the global GBUdb network." This "Good, Bad, Ugly database (GBUdb)" is a "real-time collaborative IP reputation system," based on statistics collected by email threat protection software Message Sniffer.
If you're listed on the Truncate DNSBL, can you request removal? No, explains the website. IP addresses are removed automatically, usually within a couple of days of the bad activity having ceased. They warn, however, that in some instances, if enough bad activity was denoted, it may take longer for an IP address to automatically disappear from their list.
Have any more information you'd like to share about this blocking list? Please feel free to contact me and I'll be happy to update this page with your additional information.
If you're listed on the Truncate DNSBL, can you request removal? No, explains the website. IP addresses are removed automatically, usually within a couple of days of the bad activity having ceased. They warn, however, that in some instances, if enough bad activity was denoted, it may take longer for an IP address to automatically disappear from their list.
Have any more information you'd like to share about this blocking list? Please feel free to contact me and I'll be happy to update this page with your additional information.
Status of dul.ru: DEAD
As noted by participants of the SDLU mailing list, the Russian Dial-up User List at the domain dul.ru is no more.
The Russian Dial-up User List website is no longer to be found at dul.ru; when you visit that domain you find a simple Russian-language "this domain is for sale" page.
As of May 19, 2015, this domain seems to have been set to "wildcard" status in DNS. This means that DUL.ru is effectively "listing the world;" any site still using the DUL.ru DNSBL zone will reject all inbound mail until this DNSBL is removed from that mail server's configuration.
The Russian Dial-up User list appears to have been a dialup or dynamic blocking list. The intent of this type of anti-spam tool is usually to block SMTP connections from hosts that aren't typically expected to be running mail services.
H/T: Neil Schwartzman
The Russian Dial-up User List website is no longer to be found at dul.ru; when you visit that domain you find a simple Russian-language "this domain is for sale" page.
As of May 19, 2015, this domain seems to have been set to "wildcard" status in DNS. This means that DUL.ru is effectively "listing the world;" any site still using the DUL.ru DNSBL zone will reject all inbound mail until this DNSBL is removed from that mail server's configuration.
The Russian Dial-up User list appears to have been a dialup or dynamic blocking list. The intent of this type of anti-spam tool is usually to block SMTP connections from hosts that aren't typically expected to be running mail services.
H/T: Neil Schwartzman
Reminder: AHBL is Shutting Down
As previously reported, the AHBL DNSBL has been shut down.
Please note that the publisher of the AHBL DNSBL has indicated that she will set all of the DNS zones to "wildcard" status as of January 1st. This means that AHBL will be effectively "listing the world;" any site still using any of the AHBL DNSBL zones will reject all inbound mail until the AHBL DNSBL zones are removed from that mail server's configuration.
Brielle Bruns posted the following to the SDLU mailing list on 12/26/14: "Figured I'd give one last notice that I'm about to wildcard all of the public AHBL zones on Jan 1st, 2015.
"If you are still using them in your mail servers, or know someone who is, now would be a good time to remove them. Most of the major packages that came with configuration options for using the AHBL have long since removed them (such as SpamAssassin), but there are still many many people out there who make no effort to maintain their services and/or don't upgrade/check configurations.
The private zones which some people know of and have access to will not be affected by this wildcarding, as they are still considered 'active' and 'maintained'."
Status of rbl.orbitrbl.com: DEAD
Today, Mark E. Jeftovic of EasyDNS warned readers of the Mailop list that it is unwise to use the DNSBL "rbl.orbitrbl.com" due to a combination of abandonment and administrative issues.
He writes: "As some of you may know, we recently took over ZoneEdit.com and it's customer base.
We've found a domain on the system: rbl.orbitrbl.com which is delegated to zoneedit nameservers, broken (it is not allowed to zone transfer from it's designated master), unresponsive (account owner is not answering email, has an address in Sri Lanka and no telephone number), is using excessive queries (~ >500M queries per day on a "free dns" domain) and attracting repeated, multiple DDoS attacks.
As such, we will be wildcarding this zone and setting a long TTL fairly soon.
If you're actually using this RBL in your MTAs, now's a good time to stop. (this RBL is broken on 5 out of it's 6 delegated nameservers across 3 separate providers)."
He writes: "As some of you may know, we recently took over ZoneEdit.com and it's customer base.
We've found a domain on the system: rbl.orbitrbl.com which is delegated to zoneedit nameservers, broken (it is not allowed to zone transfer from it's designated master), unresponsive (account owner is not answering email, has an address in Sri Lanka and no telephone number), is using excessive queries (~ >500M queries per day on a "free dns" domain) and attracting repeated, multiple DDoS attacks.
As such, we will be wildcarding this zone and setting a long TTL fairly soon.
If you're actually using this RBL in your MTAs, now's a good time to stop. (this RBL is broken on 5 out of it's 6 delegated nameservers across 3 separate providers)."
Status of dnsbl.ahbl.org: SHUTTING DOWN
On March 26, 2014, DNSBL administrator Brielle Bruns announced that the Abusive Hosts Blocking List DNSBLs are to be shut down.
In email to me, she explained:
I've known Brielle for many years and my interactions with her have been universally positive. Congratulations on a long eleven year run with AHBL, and I hope whatever she works on next is something she finds fun and fulfilling.
In email to me, she explained:
"After quite a bit of thought and consideration, I've decided that it is time to wind down some of the AHBL's public DNSbl services - specifically the dnsbl, ircbl, and rhsbl.
We've had a good 11 year run with the lists. Times have changed -- with the deployment of IPv6 moving full speed ahead, I don't feel that the current implementation of our DNSbl services are suited to the task.
This doesn't mean that the AHBL is going away - we'll still be around, just focusing our efforts on a mix of other anti-abuse related things and a relaunch of the RHSbl (likely in 2-3 months, possibly sooner).
I look forward to continuing to work with the community, and appreciate and value the feedback I've received over the years."As a result, the lists dnsbl.ahbl.org, ircbl.ahbl.org and rhsbl.ahbl.org, and associated public look up tools are being retired.
I've known Brielle for many years and my interactions with her have been universally positive. Congratulations on a long eleven year run with AHBL, and I hope whatever she works on next is something she finds fun and fulfilling.
Status of dnsblchile.org: ALIVE
DNSBL Chile, created in 2011, appears to be a Chilean homegrown effort to tackle spamblocking from a local perspective. As they explain on their website: "Existing DNSBL services aim to block spam based on the type and origin affecting certain types of user. Chilean spam is generally ignored by these DNSBLs, mainly because of the language barrier. This raises the need for a specific DNSBL for Chile, which is able to investigate cases of spam in South-American Spanish."
The DNSBL zone is just "dnsblchile.org" and they report a few different types of responses: 127.0.0.2 and 127.0.0.3 for "verified spam sources," 127.0.0.5 for "verified scam sources," and 127.0.0.10 and 127.0.0.11 for DUL/PBL-like dynamic/"should not be running an MTA" entries.
I don't know much about this list in particular but it's always nice to see somebody attempt to address a previously segment or region's spam problem. If you have any thoughts or details around this list, don't hesitate to drop me a line.
(Crappy translation above courtesy of my high school Spanish + a little help from Google Translate.)
The DNSBL zone is just "dnsblchile.org" and they report a few different types of responses: 127.0.0.2 and 127.0.0.3 for "verified spam sources," 127.0.0.5 for "verified scam sources," and 127.0.0.10 and 127.0.0.11 for DUL/PBL-like dynamic/"should not be running an MTA" entries.
I don't know much about this list in particular but it's always nice to see somebody attempt to address a previously segment or region's spam problem. If you have any thoughts or details around this list, don't hesitate to drop me a line.
(Crappy translation above courtesy of my high school Spanish + a little help from Google Translate.)
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